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Abstract This article examines the reasons behind the failure of Tunisia’s opposition to forge 
effective coordination and collaborative links during the Ben Ali’s regime, focusing specifically 
on the inability and unwillingness of political parties to act in concert in order to challenge Ben 
Ali’s authoritarian rule. Focussing on two attempts at opposition coordination in the 2000s 
(Rencontre Démocratique and 18 October Collectif), it demonstrates that a number of 
interconnected explanations are at the heart of this failure, which range from ideological 
differences and strategic divergence to personal rivalries amongst opposition leaders. The key 
contention of the article is that divisions within the political opposition were as important as 
regime repression in sustaining the Ben Ali regime for over 20 years in power. In addition, the 
article contends that these intra-opposition divisions and past coordination failures explain the 
absence of political parties at the helm of the 2011 uprising.  
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Introduction 
The popular uprisings that swept across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in late 2010 and 
early 2011 have caught most scholars and policy-makers by surprise.2 Indeed, over the past few 
years, mainstream scholarship on Middle East politics has tended to emphasise (and explain) the 
stability of authoritarian regimes in the region and their ability to introduce a number of seemingly 
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful to the Panos Institute in Paris for its financial support in conducting research in Tunisia. We 
wish to thank all those Tunisians who gave us their time. Francesco Cavatorta is very grateful to Paul Aarts, Kawa 
Hassan, Reinoud Leenders, Salam Kawakibi and Juliette Verhoeven for the very fruitful discussions on opposition 
dynamics in the Arab world in the context of the HIVOS Knowledge Programme based at the University of Amsterdam. 
Rikke Haugbølle is grateful to Khaled Ben Brahim for the invaluable exchange of ideas. Finally, we would like to 
acknowledge the very useful comments received by Hendrik Kraetzschmar and the anonymous referees. An earlier 
version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the British Society for Middle East Studies 
(BRISMES) held at the University of Exeter, 26-29 July, 2011.     
2 D. Byman, ‘Why Mideast Tumult Caught Scholars by Surprise’, The Chronicle of Higher Education, (February 13, 
2011).  Available at: www.chronicle.com (accessed on February 13, 2011).  
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liberalising reforms, without bringing about real democratic change.3 Whilst at first glance, this 
academic focus on authoritarian resilience might be in direct contradiction with the ‘revolutionary’ 
developments of early 2011, at a closer inspection analyses of how authoritarianism in the region 
operates and what kind of dynamics it creates in opposition circles are still relevant to our 
understanding of how politics will develop in the Arab world. Whatever the outcome of the so 
called ‘Arab Spring’, future political and institutional arrangements will be derived through path 
dependency from the relations and trends in place before the ‘Spring.’4 In addition, the enthusiasm 
with which ‘transitologist’ commentators and scholars such as Kaldor5 interpreted events in both 
Tunisia and Egypt – proclaiming a new dawn of democracy in both countries - should be 
moderated, as the outcome of the uprisings is still uncertain. As Ottaway rightly remarks, for now 
‘the presidents have left, the regimes are still in place.’6  
It is true that such genuine and widespread actions for political change have not occurred in 
decades in the region and that they might as yet result in a radical political transformation and even 
democratisation of the political system, but this is by no means a pre-determined outcome.7 
Furthermore, the main agents of this revolutionary moment in the MENA region are not to be found 
in the ‘usual suspects’8 within the political opposition parties or in civil society. This constitutes the 
most interesting aspect of these popular uprisings, and part of the explanation as to why this has 
been the case has to do with the failure of traditional opposition parties and movements to 
effectively coordinate over the last two decades in order to challenge the regimes in place. In fact 
organised political and social movements seemed to lag behind, playing catch-up with actors that 
are very loosely if at all organised into formal groups. The protests were organised largely through 
new social media and on the streets with the masses playing a significant role rather than in formal 
institutional settings. As Béchir Ben Yahmed indicates, when writing on Tunisia, ‘no party, no 
                                                 
3 See for instance Lisa Anderson, ‘Searching where the lights shines. Studying democratization in the Middle East,’ 
Annual Review of Political Science, 9 (2006), pp. 189-214 and Steven Heydemann, ‘Upgrading authoritarianism in the 
Arab world,’ The Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper, 13 (2007), pp. 1–37.  
4 The authors are indebted to Steven Heydemann for pointing out that the concept of path dependency could be applied 
in this context. 
5 M. Kaldor, ‘Civil society in 1989 and 2011’, (February 7, 2011). Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/mary-
kaldor/civil-society-in-1989-and-2011. Accessed on February 7, 2011.   
6 M. Ottaway, ‘The Presidents left, the regimes are still there’, Carnegie Endowment (February 14, 2011). Available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=42627. Accessed on February 14, 2011. 
7 See G. Friedman, ‘Egypt: the distance between enthusiasm and reality’, Stratford Weekly (February 13, 2011). 
Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110213-egypt-distance-between-enthusiasm-and-reality  Accessed on 
February 13, 2011.   
8 The authors are grateful to Kawa Hassan and Paul Aarts for coming up with the term in this context.  
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union, no politician gave the impetus for this popular uprising nor were they in any way involved,’9 
indicating that traditional political actors, whether in power or in opposition, were as surprised as 
the international community by the events. Such a situation points to an interesting paradox in the 
literature on authoritarian resilience, which had correctly identified the weakness of formal 
opposition parties and movements, whether legal or illegal, while failing, with the exception of a 
few,10 to note the revolutionary potential of the Arab street, particularly at a time of profound socio-
economic crisis.  
The crucial absence of established opposition political parties at the helm of the protests 
confirms the findings of studies that pointed to their weakness and indicates also the continued 
failure of different forms of cooperation, be they formal alliances or looser reform coalitions. For 
some time the literature on political parties in the Arab world had emphasised the significance of 
cooperation between opposition parties in challenging authoritarian rule, focusing specifically on 
cross-ideological cooperation between Islamists and leftist parties.11 In this article, we question the 
assumption of the importance of cross-ideological cooperation between opposition forces in so far 
as it has not proven to be durable, solid and effective in bringing about radical change, as the case 
of Tunisia highlights. When change arrived, as it did in Tunisia with the ouster of President Ben 
Ali, traditional opposition parties were caught off guard. Thus, in this contribution we argue that it 
is precisely the weakness/absence of cross-party cooperation that is a crucial aspect of how the 
events of early 2011 unfolded. We will look specifically at what we term ‘coordination failures’ 
between opposition parties. This does not mean that efforts at cooperation did not take place; quite 
the opposite is true, as a number of efforts were made to bring about such cooperation. In the 
Tunisian case, Martinez Fuentes examined ten instances of cross-party cooperation between 2004 
and 2009, ranging from formal electoral alliances to looser reform coalitions with no electoral 
objectives.12 These efforts testify to the realisation among opposition movements and parties that 
cooperation was indeed of primary importance, if the challenge to the authoritarian regime was to 
be strong. However, most of these attempts should be deemed ultimately unsuccessful, as they 
proved to be short-lived and prone to rapid collapse.  
                                                 
9 B. Ben Yahmed, ‘Jours de victoire…’, La Jeune Afrique, No. 2610, (16-22 January 2011), p. 4. The same point is 
made by H. Ben Abdallah El Alaoui, ‘Tunisie, les éclaireurs’, Le Monde Diplomatique, No. 683, (February 2011), p. 1.  
10 See for instance L. Sadiki, ‘Towards Arab Liberal Governance: from the Democracy of the Bread to the Democracy 
of the Vote’, Third World Quarterly, 18 (1997), pp. 127-148.  
11 For a comprehensive account of cross-ideological cooperation in the Arab world see J. Clark, ‘Threats, Structures and 
Resources,’ Comparative Politics, 43 (2010), pp. 101-120. 
12 See G. Martinez Fuentes, ‘El Islam politico Tunecino. Conflicto y coopearcion electoral en los comicios 
presidenciales de 2004 y 2009’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, No. 93/94 (2011), pp. 89-109.  
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Nevertheless, there are two specific instances of cross-party cooperation that stand out 
among the many such efforts in Tunisia, and it is on these two that this article focuses its empirical 
attention. These are Rencontre Démocratique and, more importantly, the 18 October Collectif, both 
of which were formed in the mid-2000s. There are a number of reasons that explain the focus on 
these two cooperation efforts. First of all, they were more extensive and durable than previous ones, 
with the initiative of the Collectif lasting for five years. Second, Rencontre Démocratique is 
representative of efforts at coordination made by parties that wished to ‘play’ within the rules of the 
game, while the Collectif is representative of coalitions whose members were anti-systemic and 
challenged the Tunisian political system as a whole. Third, Rencontre Démocratique was created to 
be an electoral alliance, while the Collectif was more of a front with the objective of providing 
citizens with a vision of a new Tunisia built on the shared values of democracy and human rights. 
While they deserve more attention than other short-lived and poorly coordinated initiatives such as 
the Initiative Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès13 or Coordination Démocratique,14 it is 
important to note that neither Rencontre and the Collectif succeeded where the others failed, that is 
in providing a serious challenge to the  Ben Ali regime.  
Taking this observation as its point of departure, this article explores the dynamics of the 
Tunisian opposition under the Ben Ali presidency (1987-2011), its relation to the regime and past 
efforts at building effective cross-party coalitions to press the government for liberalising reforms. 
It is the aim of this analysis to demonstrate that no strong and unified opposition existed during the 
Ben Ali era, which could have successfully challenged the foundations of the authoritarian 
government. The main reasons for this not only include the regime’s skilful use of co-optation and 
repression, as Hibou or Martinez Fuentes indicated,15 but, crucially, the profound ideological, 
personal and strategic divisions extant among the country’s opposition parties (both legal and 
outlawed). This challenges the notion emerging from other studies on other Arab countries that 
rapprochement between opposition parties is a crucial component of political change.   
As shall be discussed below, these divisions had two important consequences for the 
political process in Tunisia, past and present. First, they enabled the Ben Ali regime to govern 
                                                 
13 The INDP was an electoral alliance between three left –wing parties (Ettajdid, the Socialist party of the Left and the 
Parti du Travail Patriotique et Démocratique) that had decided to support Ahmed Brahim as a presidential candidate in 
2009. It was created just before the election and vanished after it.   
14 It was an initiative between four parties aimed at defending the rights of political prisoners. It was very much an ad 
hoc alliance without further objectives than supporting freedom of speech.   
15 See B. Hibou, La Force del’Obéissance, Paris : La Découverte, 2006. and G. Martinez Fuentes, ‘Divisive electoral 
policies within authoritarian elections: the Tunisian casuistry (1989-2009)’, Journal of North African Studies, 15 
(2010), pp. 521-534. 
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without any serious threat from the political opposition and allowed it to rule without systematically 
resorting to widespread repression until leaderless mass protests triggered a radical change in 2011. 
Second, divisions among the opposition and a history of coordination failures also make the 
management of post-revolutionary Tunisia more difficult, as parties and their leaders jockey for 
position rather than uniting behind a clear project of institutional renewal. The previous ideological, 
personal and strategic divisions that had characterised their relations have re-emerged strongly, 
notably in the attempted marginalisation of the Islamist party Al-Nahda by the secular left. 
This subsequent study of opposition dynamics in Tunisia is divided into two sections. A first 
section reviews the extant theoretical literature on opposition cooperation (involving both legal and 
illegal opposition forces) in electoral authoritarian regimes and its capacity to push for liberalising 
reforms from within the confines of the existing political order. Section two then explores the nature 
and types of opposition politics in Tunisia during the Ben Ali era and examines in detail the reasons 
why the traditional opposition parties failed to build and sustain solid coordination and 
collaborative forms of organisation, such as the formation of viable electoral alliances or broader 
based reform coalitions. This article discusses in detail the cases of Rencontre Démocratique and 
the Collectif, the most important and extensive attempts at cross-party coordination to date.  
 
Opposition cooperation under electoral authoritarianism: a theoretical discussion  
Traditional democratization theory postulates that all legitimate opposition actors16 by definition see 
authoritarian rule as the main problem that needs to be removed in order for them to have the 
possibility of running the country according to their own ideological beliefs and policy preferences. 
Such opposition actors can exist both inside and outside formal institutions and can be legal or 
illegal entities, but are all believed to share the same ‘distaste’ for the corrupt and unaccountable 
elites ruling the country and a desire for meaningful political change. Although difficult to trigger in 
entrenched authoritarian settings, this change, according to some scholars, is best achieved if and 
when the opposition is united behind a common set of reform demands and pursues a collective 
strategy of undermining the predominance of the incumbent regime. Such opposition unity can be 
beneficial in two regards. First it may help diminish the operational costs of individual (often 
                                                 
16 The definition of political opposition we utilise is from Albrecht and is the following: ‘an institution located within a 
political system but outside of the realm of governance that has decisive organisational capacities and engages in 
competitive interactions with the incumbents of a political regime based on a minimum degree of mutual acceptance.’ 
The definition can be found in H. Albrecht, ‘Introduction – Contentious politics, political opposition, and 
authoritarianism’ in H. Albrecht (ed.) Contentious politics in the Middle East. Political Opposition under 
Authoritarianism, (Florida: Florida University Press, 2010), p. 3.  
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resource-poor) opposition parties and, second, it carries the potential of increasing the capacity for 
(electoral) mobilisation. A united front, for instance, would enable the opposition to pool its support 
base; an electoral alliance would reduce the costs (human and financial) of running candidates and 
could have wider popular appeal; and a common reform agenda could present a viable alternative to 
the incumbent regime and thus attract the attention of a broader segment of society.17  
More recent scholarship on opposition coordination and collaboration in the MENA region 
has also highlighted both the occurrence and the significance of cross-party alliance-building, 
focusing specifically on patterns of cross-ideological co-operation. Schwedler18 and Browers19 on 
Yemen, Clark20 on Jordan and Abdelrahman21 on Egypt all emphasise the relevance of cross-
ideological cooperation, with Browers arguing that there are even ‘antecedents of contemporary 
cross-ideological coordination among various oppositional elements that have traditionally opposed 
each other.’22 She further argues that this challenges the idea that the formalisation of cross-
ideological cooperation ‘lack[s] thinking, lack[s] constrictive political programmes, and lack[s] 
political…significance.’23 The importance of these efforts should not be denied a priori, but there 
are two elements that might moderate the enthusiasm for such cooperation. First of all, cross-
ideological cooperation might be undermined by personal rivalries and/or strategic differences that 
affect relations between parties and their leaders, thus limiting the capacity to build a broad based 
opposition front against the authoritarian incumbent even in the presence of ideological moderation. 
As Wegner and Pellicer highlight in their contribution on Morocco in this special issue, when 
ideology is not an explanatory variable for the absence of coordination, there might exist other 
factors at play such as ‘asymmetry in electoral strength.’ Second, there is also evidence that 
opposition parties might perform, willingly or indirectly, a radically different role to the one 
envisaged in the democratization literature and to the one that studies on inter -party collaboration 
in the MENA suggest. Thus, they can, paradoxically, function as pillars of authoritarian survival 
                                                 
17 N. Van de Walle, ‘Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce?,’ in A. Schedler (ed.) Electoral 
Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 77-92. See also, H. 
Kraetzschmar, ‘Opposition Cooperation in Electoral Autocracies: the united National front for Change in Egypt’s 2005 
Parliamentary Elections’ in H. Albrecht (ed.) Contentious politics in the Middle East. Political Opposition under 
Authoritarianism, (Florida: Florida University Press, 2010).   
18 J. Schwedler, Faith in Moderation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
19 M. Browers, ‘Origins and Architects of Yemen’s Joint Meeting Press’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
39 (2007), pp. 565-586.    
20 J. Clark, ‘The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan’, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 38 (2006), pp. 539-560. 
21 M. Abdelrahman, ‘With the Islamsits? – Sometimes. With the State? – Never! Cooperation between the Left and 
Islamists in Egypt’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 36 (2009), pp. 37-54. 
22 M. Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 175. 
23 Ibid., p. 175. 
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itself.24 This is for two main reasons. First of all, a number of opposition parties and movements 
have been traditionally co-opted by the ruling elites, maintaining therefore only virtual autonomy. 
Accepting to be co-opted is due to multiple reasons, including the perceived/real threat of 
repression or the genuine belief that preferred policy choices can be better pursued by cooperating 
with the authoritarian ruler/regime than by opposing it.25 More material motives can also enter the 
calculation regarding the acceptance of co-optation. Such benefits might include legalisation, access 
to public funding, or guaranteed seats in parliament.26 The second reason for accepting co-optation 
is that there might be the legitimate expectation that participating to institutional life, even under 
tutelage, might constitute relevant training and experience if and when the authoritarian structures 
vanish.   
From the regime’s point of view, attempting to co-opt the country’s opposition parties is 
beneficial in two regards. First, it enables the regime to control what opposition actors do while at 
the same time being able to present a façade of pluralism to the international community. Second, 
Islamist and secular/leftist opposition parties/movements in the MENA region tend to subscribe to 
radically opposed ideologies and these divisions, which might also include strategic and personal 
rivalries, can be manipulated for successful ‘divide and conquer’ tactics. The contention here is that 
while there have been examples of cross-ideological co-operation between these two sets of 
opposition forces and a convergence towards a shared definition of democratic accountability, 
mutual suspicions still remain and make successful opposition co-operation between such 
ideologically diverse actors very difficult. This has led some secular opposition parties to side, at 
times, with the regime rather than with Islamist movements and vice versa. In addition, divisions 
have also emerged in the same ideological camp with regard to the choice of cooperating with 
ideological rivals, further fragmenting opposition politics, as for instance the rifts within the 
Moroccan left over the issue of cooperation with the Islamist group Justice and Charity 
demonstrate.27  
                                                 
24 See for instance H. Albrecht, ‘How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt,’ 
Democratization, 12 (2005), pp. 378-397. 
25 For a discussion on the dilemma between co-optation and marginalisation see F. Cavatorta, ‘More than Repression; 
Strategies of Regime Survival. The Significance of Divide et Impera in Morocco’, Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, 25 (2007), pp. 187-203.   
26 For a discussion on the role of material benefits for parties accepting authoritarian regimes’ terms for participation see 
E. Lust, ‘Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan’, Democratization, 13 (2006), pp. 456-
471.  
27 E. Dalmasso and F. Cavatorta, ‘The Emerging Power of Civil Society? The Human Rights Doctrine’ in B. Maddy-
Weitzman and D. Zisenwine (eds.) Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI, 
(Routledge, London, forthcoming 2012).  
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Thus, following the post-democratization theoretical input,28 we postulate that self-defined 
political opposition needs not to be opposed to authoritarianism per se in so far as the authoritarian 
gatekeeper can also be a useful ally to combat the ideological and policy positions of rival 
opposition parties. It is possible therefore to hypothesise that sectors of the opposition might accept 
the ‘current rules of the game’, i.e. the parameters of authoritarian rule, and operate not to change 
the regime but to modify the structure of the public sphere. When this occurs, cross-party 
cooperation is rendered much more difficult as opponents can accuse each other of ‘selling out’ (for 
those who accept the rules of the game) and of ‘extremism’ (for those who refuse to accept to work 
with the regime). All this inevitably poisons the relations between parties and leaders whose main 
objective should be to unite to change the institutional structures they operate in. This connects to 
what Albrecht calls ‘anti-incumbent and anti-policy opposition.’29 What he means by this is that 
that a ‘loyal’ opposition opposes the incumbents or specific policies that the regime might 
implement, but does not oppose the rules of the game and therefore implicitly accepts the 
authoritarian nature of the system and plays within its limits, because there is a fear of a democratic 
chaos in which they might be the losers if the gatekeeper were to be removed. In addition to these 
types of opposition, there exists what have been termed ‘anti-systemic forces’, which are usually the 
target of relentless regime repression because they advocate a radical overhaul of the political 
system. The dynamics that these types of political opposition generate in Arab countries are an 
important explanatory variable for the resilience of authoritarianism, going beyond the exclusive 
reliance on overt and sustained repression that is often used to account for the persistence of 
authoritarian rule.30 
Furthermore, and contrary to the literature on cross-ideological cooperation, we argue that 
such co-operation is over-emphasised and that profound differences still remain, affecting the way 
in which authoritarian rulers are confronted, the manner in which radical regime change might 
come about and where it would lead to. In order to explain how the Tunisian opposition was both 
unable to face down Ben Ali and be almost unaware of the societal rage against the regime and 
guide it, we hypothesise that it is critical to understand the divisions that exist between opposition 
parties and their failure to forge effective forms of cross-party cooperation. Similarly to other 
                                                 
28 For a discussion on post-democratization see M. Valbjørn and A. Bank, ‘Examining the Post in Post-
Democratization: The Future of Middle Eastern Political Rule through the Lenses of the Past’, Middle East Critique, 19 
(2010), pp. 183-200.  
29 Albrecht, Contentious politics in the Middle East, 2010, p. 7. 
30 E. Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East’, Comparative Politics, 36 (2004), pp. 139-157.  
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studies, 31 we argue here that the most significant divisions within the opposition rest on ideological, 
strategic and personal conflicts and some of these divisions have not disappeared in the post-Ben 
Ali era. It is the failure of the opposition to generate unitary discourses and practices that partly 
explains the success of the ‘divide et impera’ strategies of the regime and account for their inability 
to ‘read’ the mood of Tunisian society, which had to resort to the ‘street’ to finally achieve some 
form of political change.  
The next section will discuss the party politics dynamics that characterised the vast family of 
Tunisian opposition since the creation of the state to highlight the way in which coordination 
failures allowed the Ben Ali’s regime to survive for three decades.  
 
The opposition landscape under Ben Ali: between ideological, strategic and personal rivalries 
Opposition politics always had a difficult time in Tunisia since independence, as the ruling party 
established by Bourguiba (1956-1987) and re-named and re-shaped under Ben Ali dominated the 
political landscape in a country with no democracy from 1956.32 Nevertheless, over time a number 
of opposition political parties managed to emerge. The most important of these include the 
Mouvement d’Unité Populaire (MUP), the Mouvement des Démocrates Socialistes (MDS), Al-
Nahda (previously known as the Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique, MTI) and the Parti d’ Unité 
Populaire (PUP). With the exception of the Islamist Al-Nahda, virtually all political parties 
belonging to the ‘historical opposition’ are, in one way or the other, off-springs of the original Neo-
Destour party, which was set up by Bourguiba in the 1930s and dominated political life until the 
departure of Ben Ali.33 As such they all share a vaguely socialist ideology; their main differences 
residing in questions of what form of socialism should be implemented. In addition, their history 
suggests that none of these parties were created in order to represent emerging social constituencies 
or new social groups, but were essentially the product of personal rivalries. Consequently a strong 
personality element has prevailed amongst leaders and members of Tunisia’s opposition parties, 
inhibiting proper institutionalisation and making parties vehicles for self-promotion rather than 
transmission belts between society and the state.  This ‘personality’ element had been thus noted in 
1999: 
 
                                                 
31 F. Cavatorta, ‘Divided they Stand, Divided they Fail: Opposition Politics in Morocco’, Democratization, 16 (2009), 
pp. 137-156.    
32 The Neo-Destour was the party that led Tunisia to independence. It was renamed Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD) in 
1964 and re-named again under Ben Ali as Rassemblement Constitutionel Démocratique  (RCD).   
33 K. Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
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‘(…) none of the opposition parties possesses effective leadership: instead, they are 
disorganised and internally divided – the production of personality clashes between power-
hungry members. Moreover, the parties squabble among themselves, failing to achieve joint 
positions or action. The parties do not articulate clear policy programmes. The parties on the left 
are crippled because communism is incompatible with Islam, or because socialism has been 
discredited, or because Arab nationalism is passé.’34 
 
 A genuine challenge to the dominant socialist and nationalist ideologies, that shaped the 
embryonic party politics of the country, emerged with the creation of an Islamist party named Al-
Nahda in the late 1980s. Founded by Rashid Ghannouchi in 1981, Al-Nahda introduced a very 
different ideology of reference in the secular Tunisia that both Bourguiba and Ben Ali were intent 
on crafting, and has therefore been much more severely repressed during the Ben Ali’s era than any 
other political movement/party in the country, with the exception of the Tunisian Party of 
Communist Workers (PCOT).35 
Lastly, it should also be noted that during the Ben Ali era, a number of other opposition 
parties emerged, such as the Parti Démocrate Progressiste (PDP, founded by Nejib Chebbi in 1983 
and legalised in 1988 when it was still named Rassemblement Socialiste Progressiste), the Congres 
pour la République (founded in 2001 by Moncef Marzouki but never legalised under Ben Ali) and 
Ettajdid, heir to the Tunisian Communist Party, founded and legalised in 1993. Thus, over time, the 
Tunisian political landscape changed and witnessed the arrival of a host of new political parties, all 
of which claimed to offer an alternative to the authoritarian status quo, yet most of them remained 
anchored to socialist or social-democratic principles with the real alternative to the political left 
being presented only by Al-Nahda. The rising number of political parties, however, did not 
significantly alter the authoritarian nature of the political system at the time, and their inability to 
coordinate effectively due to ideological, personal and strategic divisions partially explains the 
survival of authoritarianism for over five decades. 
As mentioned above, since independence in 1956 and until the departure of Ben Ali in 
January 2011, Tunisia had only known two presidents – Bourguiba and Ben Ali - both of whom 
believed that they would remain in their posts for life and therefore built political structures to 
ensure precisely that. Both presidents headed a highly personalised political system, based largely 
around clientelist structures, but they nevertheless used formally autonomous institutions to govern 
the country, and their ruling party featured in this institutional design.  
                                                 
34 M. Penner Angrist, ‘Parties, Parliament and Political Dissent in Tunisia’, Journal of North African Studies, 4(1999), 
pp. 89-104.  
35 R. Basly, ‘The Future of al-Nahda in Tunisia’, Arab Reform Bulletin (April 20, 2011). Available at: 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=43675. Accessed on April 27, 2011.   
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Initially, the very history of opposition politics in Tunisia is bound up with ideological 
differences within the broad left. In 1973 the first Tunisian opposition party was created in exile by 
Ahmad Ben Saleh, a onetime close ally of Bourguiba within Neo-Destour, who objected to the 
abandonment of strict socialist economic policies on the part of the President. After spending some 
time in prison, Ben Saleh, who was accused of harbouring too rigorous socialist ambitions that 
undermined national unity,36 fled for Algeria where he set up the Mouvement d’Unité Populaire 
(MUP) to challenge the dominance of Bourguiba’s ruling party. The creation of MUP, which was 
not legalised, was the outcome of a long and tense relationship between Ben Saleh and Bourguiba. 
Ben Saleh had much stronger socialist inclinations and as the leader of the General Union of the 
Tunisian Workers (UGTT) he sought the implementation of a clear socialist programme that he 
believed the Neo-Destour party should adopt. Bourguiba, however, was conscious of the problems 
that sticking to a strict socialist agenda might cause in the countryside for wealthy land-owners and 
as Perkins noted  
 
‘(…) after independence greatly divergent views about the nature of the independent state 
[emerged]. Particularly acute philosophical differences between the union and the party meant 
that tightening Neo-Destour control over the UGTT assumed an extremely high priority 
following independence.’37  
 
When this occurred a showdown between the two men became inevitable and Ben Saleh 
became an opposition figure. Due to its illegal status, the MUP was heavily repressed and the party 
split, with a faction moving on in 1979 to found the Parti d’ Unité Populaire (PUP), which adopted 
a very similar ideological outlook to the MUP’s. The PUP’s leadership however adopted a pro-
regime line, was legalised in 1983 and its party’s leaders, first Mohamed Belhaj Amor and then 
Mohamed Bouchiha, ran in the presidential elections organised by Ben Ali in 1999, 2004 and 2009, 
providing the Tunisian regime with some of the ‘pluralist’ legitimacy it needed for external 
consumption.  
When Ben Ali came to power in a palace coup against incumbent Bourguiba in November 
1987, he promised to initiate democratic reforms and greater political pluralism. Following on his 
promise, he offered opposition parties a national pact, according to which they would refrain from 
destabilising the existing political order in exchange for the gradual introduction of liberalising 
                                                 
36 See E. Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia. From Bourguiba to Ben Ali (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1999). 
37 Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia, p. 134.  
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reforms. In order to provide credibility for his political project, Ben Ali legalised a number of 
previously banned political parties including Chebbi’s PDP and the Parti Social-Libéral (PSL). 
However, this ‘democratic spring’ in Ben Ali’s Tunisia proved to be short lived, with the president 
reneging on his reform pledges once he had secured his own position at the helm of government. 
Nonetheless, despite ever increasing government repression, several opposition parties, including 
the PUP, continued to operate in the political and electoral arena, playing the role of a ‘loyal’ 
opposition.38 In a 2009 interview, the PUP leader Bouchiha argued strongly that ‘the party’s 
programme meets the expectations of citizens and that the party does not want to be negative all the 
time’39, indicating that political parties that constantly criticise what is wrong with the Tunisian 
political system are doing a disservice to what the President is attempting to do, which is the 
gradual introduction of democracy. The Tunisian newspaper Le Temps also reported that the 
Political Bureau of the PUP saw the participation of Bouchiha in the presidential elections of 2009 
as ‘the proof of the very positive political climate that exists today in Tunisia.’40 Bouchiha and the 
PUP believed that participation in the political structures set up by Ben Ali was necessary to 
achieve some of the objectives of the party and his brand of modern socialism. Cooperation with the 
government was thus deemed more advantageous to the party’s positions than being left at the 
margins of decision-making.  
The path followed by the PUP is indicative of how the stark choice between co-optation and 
repression that Ben Ali offered to opposition parties undermined the possibility of strong 
coordination amongst the country’s opposition. Indeed, those parties that accepted to play the game 
according to the rules of the regime, quickly lost credibility with opposition forces which had 
decided that such a compromise constituted in fact a ‘sell-out’ of democratic values and principles. 
It is interesting to note in this context, that the ripples of the choices made by opposition parties at 
the time can still be felt in the early post-Ben Ali era with the Mouvement des Démocrates 
Socialistes (MDS) being the target of particular vitriol.  
The MDS, founded by Ahmad Mestiri in 1978 after he left the PSD and legalised in 1981, is 
another example of a political party created to challenge the regime that ended up as one of its main 
pillars when Ben Ali took over as president. Just like other political parties at the time, it signed the 
national pact proposed by Ben Ali in 1988. The MDS was at the time the strongest opposition party 
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and was believed to be a genuine contender for power. As Angrist (1999) underlines, ‘the MDS’s 
platform calls for multiparty competition, liberty of expression, improved human right practices, the 
augmentation of individual and group freedoms, and the separation of the ruling party’s apparatus 
from that of the state.’41 Similar to the MUP, the party, however, quickly split on the issue of its 
relations with the Ben Ali regime, with Mohamed Mouadda closely aligning himself with the 
President, particularly on the issue of anti-Islamist repression, whilst Mustapha Ben Jafaar moved 
on in 1994 to found the Forum Démocratique pour le Travail et les Libertés (FDTL), which took a 
more critical stance toward the regime and what it described as its authoritarian tendencies.42 The 
FDTL, a social-democratic party, was eventually legalised in 2007 in an attempt by the regime to 
render the 2009 presidential elections more credible. The alignment of the MDS to Ben Ali’s 
positions occurred in the early 1990s. In 1994 the MDS supported Ben Ali’s bid for re-election, in 
exchange of which the party was able to win 10 seats in parliament out of 163. The same scenario 
was repeated in 1999 when the party officially supported Ben Ali’s presidential election bid, for 
which it was this time rewarded with 16 seats in parliament out of 182.43 In 1995, the MDS 
experienced further internal divisions when Mouadda criticised the regime and was jailed for it 
despite his previous support, with some members following Mouadda and others denouncing his 
new anti-regime stance. An internal battle ensued as to who really controlled the party.   
Unlike most of its secular counterparts, Ghannouchi’s Al-Nahda party never obtained legal 
status under the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, and was only recently legalised by the transitional 
authorities in Tunisia in 2011. During the 1987/1988 period Ben Ali had invited Al-Nahda to join 
the other opposition parties in signing the national pact, and the Islamists did indeed sign up to the 
agreement. The party was allowed to run independent candidates in the 1989 legislative elections 
and according to many observers did very well. It is precisely this good performance that made Ben 
Ali renege on his promise of legalisation, particularly given the developing situation in Algeria at 
the same time.44 The Islamist challenge in Tunisia was met with harsh repression and the fear of 
Islamism became a powerful instrument that Ben Ali used to co-opt a number leftist parties and 
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42 See the September 25, 2009 interview by Le Monde’s correspondent Florence Beaugé with Ben Jaafar available at 
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leaders who were equally afraid of Al-Nahda for the policies it might implement if in power, 
including the complete dismantling of even nominal democratic structures.45          
Ben Ali’s strategy from the beginning of his rule was the attempt to divide and conquer the 
opposition parties that had signed up to the national pact in 1988, playing specifically on the 
ideological differences and well-known strategic divergences that affected them. In this he was 
quite successful and the coordination failures that have plagued the Tunisian opposition ever since 
the 1990s can be traced to this period in Tunisian history. The reliance of Ben Ali on the repressive 
apparatus should not be underestimated as a cause of these coordination failures, but opposition 
parties contributed significantly to them due to their divergences. The most sensitive ideological 
division on which Ben Ali played during his reign was the one between secular parties and 
Islamists. There was for instance a strong ideological element linked to the issue of supporting a 
ban on Al-Nahda. The small leftist party Ettajdid and the Democratic Communist Party, for 
instance, were ideologically so opposed to Al-Nahda, going as far as to denying them the 
democratic right to participate because of the belief that political Islam is inherently contrary to 
democracy. Other parties, including the PDP, argued by contrast that legalisation was a right for Al-
Nahda no matter how unpalatable the political positions of Islamists might be. In the end, while not 
all secular parties were necessarily anti-Islamist - with some insisting that all parties of the national 
pact be granted legal status, thus including the Islamist- the majority preferred to see the Islamist 
party banned and supported the regime on this initiative. This was due to three interconnected 
reasons. First of all, in the late 1980s suspicion was still rife that the Tunisian Islamists, despite 
their pro-democracy declarations, were essentially lying and would, if voted in, install an Iranian-
style theocracy instead. Second, the Algerian civil war of the 1990s played a crucial role in 
convincing the regime of the danger that Islamists posed and, quite significantly, it seemed to also 
convince many within the secular opposition camp that political Islam in all of its forms was 
dangerous and that therefore a secular dictatorship was preferable to a potentially Islamist one. 
Finally, in the 1989 legislative elections, the Islamists, running as independents came second, while 
the other opposition parties together received no more than three per cent of the votes cast. This 
electoral defeat encouraged some to ask for the exclusion of Islamists to avoid marginalisation in an 
electoral game dominated by the ruling Rassemblement Constitutionel Démocratique (RCD) and 
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Al-Nahda.46 As indicated in the theory section, this highlights that for some opposition parties the 
authoritarian gatekeeper can under certain circumstances be perceived as an ally rather than a 
political rival.  
The issue of the legalisation of Al-Nahda thus carried serious repercussions on the secular 
left, because parties that were otherwise ideologically close to one another were critically divided 
over this issue, further fragmenting the opposition camp.47 In this manner cross-party cooperation is 
rendered more difficult because the crucial issue of forming an alliance with the strongest 
opposition party, the Islamists, becomes a terrain of contestation.  
To compound ideological differences, there were other strategic factors that fragmented the 
country’s political opposition. There is no disputing the fact, for instance, that some of Ben Ali’s 
social and political initiatives went in the direction that some opposition parties on the left and 
dissidents of the Bourguiba era appreciated, such as for example re-enforcing the progressive family 
code, the strengthening of public services in health and education, and insulating the country from 
the threat of Islamist violence. The seemingly impressive results of Ben Ali’s socio-political 
reforms divided the secular left between those who supported these policies and those who 
criticised the authoritarian methods of policy-formation. The latter parties included, amongst others, 
the MDS, Ettadjdid and the PUP, all of which decided to work within the confines of the existing 
order, not simply because they derived material benefits, but also because of a genuine conviction 
that some of Ben Ali’s most significant policy positions and achievements coincided with their own 
vision of what Tunisia should be doing. In order to continue down this road of progressive social 
reforms, these opposition parties thus sought it necessary to marginalise the Islamists; and keeping 
them out of power therefore became the mantra not only of the regime, but of many opposition 
parties and civil society organisations. For many within the women’s movement, for instance, it was 
clear that the struggle against Islamism was more important than the struggle for genuine 
democracy and in this struggle the regime was an ally, although a thoroughly disliked one.48  
Existent ideological and strategic divisions within the opposition were further compounded 
by petty personal rivalries amongst party leaders, which further diminished the prospects for cross-
party cooperation during the Ben Ali era. Indeed, personality clashes and rivalries had not only 
contributed to the fragmentation of existing opposition parties, as highlighted above, but caused the 
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16 
 
collapse of various electoral alliances that had been forged to improve the performance of the 
opposition in otherwise rigged and fraudulent parliamentary elections. In 2004, for instance, four 
opposition parties – the PUP, PSL, UDU and the Greens (PVP) – sought the formation of such an 
electoral alliance, under the banner of Rencontre Démocratique (Democratic Gathering), to contest 
the upcoming parliamentary poll. These parties had made the decision to work within the 
authoritarian rules of the game and intended to challenge Ben Ali by working from within the 
system. In order to increase their visibility and maximise their electoral gains, they set out to build a 
cross-party forum for discussion on potential shared principles. This forum would be turned into an 
electoral alliance, but this alliance was short-lived and collapsed ‘amidst accusations that some 
party leaders tried to use the bloc to enhance their own standing rather than to build real unity.’49 
Initially, this coordinating effort revolved around discussions on joint initiatives on three themes: a) 
defending freedom of expression, association and press; b) institutional reforms including the 
electoral system and c) the issue of political prisoners and an amnesty for them.50 One of the points 
that emerged in the discussion was the parties’ opposition to political Islam and if anything, it 
became clear that fighting what they called extremism was their most significant point of 
agreement. Thus, the decision to work within the authoritarian institutions and the anti-Islamist 
agenda both undermined the possibility of extending cross-party cooperation to political formations 
that did not believe in Ben Ali’s democratic gradualism and did not support the marginalisation of 
Al-Nahda.  
The initiative of Rencontre Démocratique took place at the same time when other opposition 
parties such as the PDP, the Congrés pour la République, the PCOT and Al-Nahda were calling for 
a boycott of the 2004 presidential and legislative elections to protest against the authoritarianism of 
president Ben Ali and against what they saw as his failure to follow through his rhetorical 
commitment to democracy. The partial boycott of the elections indicated that a number of 
opposition parties had come to the conclusion that the system could not be reformed and needed to 
be radically changed. Thus, the initiative of the Rencontre and the call for the boycott exposed the 
divisions of the opposition on the most crucial matters.  
 
The October 18 Collectif: Cross-ideological cooperation against the odds?  
After the 2004 elections, a more significant attempt at cross-party coordination was made by 
Tunisia’s opposition with the formation of the so called October 18 Collectif, hereafter simply 
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referred to as the Collectif. This alliance, which was born in 2005 and comprised both legal and 
illegal parties, was forged with the aim of formulating a shared set of principles and reform 
demands around which to challenge the Ben Ali regime. On various levels the Collectif constituted 
a novelty in the Tunisian opposition political landscape, certainly compared to the preceding 
Rencontre Démocratique alliance.  For one, it did not only comprise parties and movements of the 
secular opposition, such as the PCOT, the Nasserites, and a number of human rights groups, but 
also the Islamist Al-Nahda party. In contrast to Rencontre Démocratique, which was mainly 
composed of leftist parties, the Collectif thus cut across the entire ideological spectrum. Second, the 
Collectif was active for over five years, and this despite being composed of parties with vastly 
different ideological positions and being targeted by the repressive apparatus of the regime. 
Three parties were at the forefront of its creation in 2005. These were the PDP, the Congrés 
pour la République and Al-Nahda. At the time, and in contrast to the other parties of the ‘historical 
opposition’ the PDP presented itself a genuine opposition party, thus functioning as magnet of 
leftists disillusioned with those parties on the left which had opted to support the regime as ‘loyal 
opposition’. As mentioned earlier, Chebbi had founded the party in 1983, then known as the 
Rassemblement Socialiste pour le Progres (RSP). In 1988, when still operating under the banner of 
the RSP, the party was a signatory of the national pact and supported the early attempts made by 
Ben Ali to liberalise the political system inherited from Bourguiba.51 However, the party became 
sceptical of the process of gradual democratisation and increased its criticism of Ben Ali to an 
extent that by the early 2000s it was openly arguing that the authoritarian structures in place should 
be removed entirely. In order to gather more support in its struggle with the regime, the party was 
re-branded with the removal of all references to socialism and sought to broaden its support basis by 
becoming less doctrinaire in its programme. By the early 2000s, in fact, it had become absolutely 
clear to the PDP leadership that Ben Ali’s promises of democratisation was all but an empty shell, 
with the ‘war on terror’ providing the regime ongoing cover for the harassment and repression of all 
political opponents.52 The necessity to build a wider opposition front, including the Islamists, in 
order to undermine the authoritarian stability of the regime and bring about democratic reforms thus 
became a key strategic objective of the PDP leadership.  
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A second figure instrumental in the setting up of the Collectif was Marzouki, leader of the 
Congrés pour la République. A long-time human rights activist who had unsuccessfully attempted 
to run for president in 1994 and who had on various occasions challenged the regime only to be 
imprisoned and exiled, Marzouki had become convinced that the formation of a broad coalition of 
opposition forces committed to democratic principles and political pluralism was necessary to 
challenge the regime. Ben Ali’s strategy of ‘democratic gradualism’ was no longer credible within 
many sectors of the Tunisian left and the anti-Islamist rhetoric also sounded hollow in the face of 
increasing repression, growing economic inequalities, and rampant corruption. Al-Nahda had for 
some time called on all opposition forces in Tunisia to participate in a national dialogue that would 
have the objective of setting out the principles upon which a new political system could be set up 
and the duo Chebbi/Marzouki took the risk of accepting such a dialogue. 
The experience of working together on calls for the partial boycott of the 2004 
parliamentary and presidential elections had demonstrated the need to transcend a priori ideological 
positions, as it was the first sign that cooperation across ideological lines was possible. It has been 
argued that cross-ideological cooperation in North Africa is particularly difficult because the 
ideological discourse of the parties of the left is very much influenced by the French notion of 
laicité, which makes it more difficult to accept any role for explicitly religious parties and their 
objective of formulating policies through religious principles. 53 However, the trust that had been 
built between the PDP, the Congrés pour la République and al-Nahda in 2004 during the 
experience of the partial boycott made it possible to overcome ideological divisions. The Collectif 
attempted to go beyond the pragmatic need for unity against the common enemy and was designed 
as a vision of a future Tunisia, where shared democratic principles would regulate social and 
political relations. Thus, it demonstrated that divisions could also be overcome through intellectual 
exchanges around the most sensitive topics such as societal pluralism, democratic procedures and 
women’s rights.  In addition to this, the Collectif demonstrated that personalistic objectives could be 
set aside, with the leading members of the three parties engaging in meaningful discussions rather 
than grandstanding.  
As mentioned earlier, the Collectif is remarkable not only in its cross-ideological 
composition but also long-term survival. Indeed, the five-year long engagement and dialogue 
between the parties comprising the October 18 Collectif  that began in 2005 led to the publication in 
2010 of a volume entitled ‘Our way towards democracy’, where democratic principles of 
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governance were affirmed to be the shared patrimony of all parties involved in the discussion. In an 
interview with the Financial Times, Ghannouchi argued that the Collectif was not simply ‘a short-
term political coalition, but a social project for society,’54 given that the parties had agreed on the 
fundamental pillars that should be put in place once authoritarianism was overthrown. These 
comprised political and social pluralism, as long as it is not expressed through violence, the rights 
of women and gender equality and freedom of conscience.  
Thus, much like in other Arab countries, some opposition forces that had previously failed 
to cooperate in order to present a more serious challenge against the incumbent regime found cross-
party and cross-ideological cooperation both necessary and rewarding in the sense that it 
contributed to dispel some of the mutual suspicions that previously existed between them. In so far 
as such diverse political and social movements were able to create a forum for engaging with each 
other under the same banner and with shared principles, the Collectif could be considered a success. 
As Al-Nahda leading member Abdel Salam stated ‘dialogue between the Islamists and the 
secularists has shown that ideological differences can be surmounted’55, declaring the experience of 
the Collectf a success. The expressed enthusiasm of Al-Nahda is tempered, however, by the 
assessment of secular participants to the Collectif. Lotfi Hajji argued that ‘the coalition does not 
represent a united front as there are many issues on which its members are divided’, while Fathi 
Belhaj lists a number of ongoing difficulties that the Collectif faces, including the obstacle of 
ideological differences.56 These seemingly diverging attitudes illustrate the difficulty in assessing 
the success of this initiative. For some, the fact that cross-party and cross-ideological discussions 
took place is sufficient to argue that the initiative is a success, while for others the failure to agree 
on significant issues, such as for example the level of cooperation that should be had with foreign 
powers or the creation of an electoral alliance, indicate that the Collectif could only have a limited 
influence.  
More specifically, there are four reasons as to why the experience of the Collectif should be 
evaluated more sombrely. First of all, repression played a crucial role, as all of the parties involved 
in the alliance found it extremely difficult to operate openly with most of their activities taking 
place in exile.57 Operating from abroad left the parties in exile open to the accusation of working for 
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foreign powers and/or ideologies. These accusations, although coming from a less than credible 
regime, did undermine trust between those in exile and the ones active inside Tunisia. Second, other 
legalised opposition parties did not take part in this effort, undermining the very notion that the 
Collectif represented the whole of the opposition, as Ettajdid, the Greens (PVP), the Democratic 
Communists and other minor parties in addition to prominent members of women’s rights and 
human rights groups did not wish to take part.58 Third, it took the member parties of the Collectif 
quite some time to agree on the basic principles of cooperation, with the final document published 
only five years after the alliance had been created. While the time was certainly necessary to iron 
out issues related to liberal rights and commitment to democratic procedures, and work out deeply-
held mutual suspicions, five years is a long time in politics. This continued focus on working 
through their differences left the parties unable to read the changing popular mood. Finally, the 
experience of the Collectif was an exercise in ‘old politics’ that many Tunisians had grown 
disillusioned with. Opposition political parties had been around for quite some time by this stage 
and did not seem to enjoy widespread credibility with the public.59 In fact, throughout the 2000s, 
the very limited opposition politics permissible was largely taking place in the confines of some 
professional associations and through social networks that were not linked to parties. In addition, 
the personalities involved in the Collectif have a very long history and track record as politicians, 
which, again was not necessarily an advantage in a country where politicians did not enjoy great 
legitimacy. The fact that they had been around for long also undermined their stance with younger 
generations of Tunisians, as acknowledged by Rachid Ghannouchi himself. By the time they had 
managed to agree on common principles of action, the leaderless revolution had already moved on 
significantly, bypassing traditional political party structures. Ultimately, it should be highlighted 
that, despite its calls for boycotts of the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections and its productive 
discussions on the meaning of democracy that would apply across parties, the Collectif did not 
initiate the uprising, failed to sustain it unequivocally (the PDP’s leadership did not for instance call 
for Ben Ali’s departure) and was eventually taken over by events on the ground, which it had not 
predicted. As made clear by Kausch, ‘a great deal of disunity’60 has always characterised opposition 
party politics in Tunisia and when finally cross-ideological cooperation became a reality, the parties 
involved were overtaken by political events on Tunisia’s streets.   
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Finally and probably more importantly, old divisions are emerging again in preparation of 
the October 2011 elections for the Constitutional Assembly, with the traditional suspicions of the 
democratic commitment of the Islamists resurfacing among leftists, including Chebbi. The state’s 
laicité has become a central issue of current political debates in Tunisia, as Al-Nahda is proving to 
be the better equipped party to run the election campaign, particularly at a time when many 
Tunisians seem to desire some sort of role of religion in public policy.61 More than ninety political 
parties have been legalised in Tunisia since the departure of Ben Ali, in recognition that competition 
between a plurality of parties still provides the main tool for ensuring democratic representation and 
accountability. However, the divisions of the past are still haunting the present transition and appear 
to affect the way in which party politics is developing in post-revolutionary Tunisia with disunity 
and fragmentation being blamed for the inability to offer a clear path out of the chaos that the 
departure of Ben Ali has left. This in turn has led to disaffection towards party politics on the part of 
many ordinary citizens and this constitutes a potentially significant problem for the process of 
regime change.62   
 
Conclusion 
It would be presumptuous to state that there are already clear lessons to be learned at this stage from 
the Tunisian uprising and it would be out of place to attempt to already explain what circumstances 
led to the uprising and the departure of Ben Ali on January 14, 2011. However, an examination of 
opposition politics in Tunisia during the Ben Ali’s regime can partly explain why opposition parties 
not only failed to predict and spark the uprising, but also why in its aftermath they seem to be 
struggling to gain legitimacy. The national pact offered by Ben Ali in 1988 to parties that had been 
repressed during the previous regimes seemed to offer the potential for a genuine involvement of 
opposition parties in the construction of a new democratic Tunisia. However, Ben Ali had other 
plans and quickly hijacked the process of liberalisation he had initiated and increasingly turned 
Tunisia into a police state. As part of his strategy, Ben Ali began to implement divide and conquer 
policies aimed at taming the opposition. This was possible and ultimately successful because of 
three factors, namely (1) ideological rivalries, including the left’s mistrust of the Islamists and intra-
left disagreements, (2) strategic differences as to the position to take vis à vis the regime and (3) 
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personal disputes. Divide and conquer strategies have been common currency in the Arab world and 
the weakness of the opposition, demonstrated in its inability to build lasting and potent reform 
coalitions,  finds confirmation in the Tunisian case. This is despite a growing literature stressing the 
relevance of cross-party collaboration within the opposition and more specifically cross-ideological 
cooperation.  
For the most strategic and thoughtful of party leaders, cross-ideological co-operation 
became the strategy to pursue, if a challenge to the regime was to be successful. Chebbi of the PDP, 
Ghannouchi of Al-Nahda and Marzouki of the Congres pour la Republique created the Collectif 
alliance in 2005, with the intent of opposing the regime and providing a democratic blueprint for 
Tunisia. As positively as it does compare to prior cooperation efforts or more appropriately the lack 
thereof, even the Collectif can in the end not claim to have been successful, as it was also plagued 
by significant internal disagreements that prevented it from emerging as a strong and coherent 
opposition front, capable of challenging the authoritarian foundations of the Ben Ali regime. Nor 
was the Collectif significantly involved in the 2011 uprising which brought down the Ben Ali 
regime, and was driven by a new set political actors drawn together by the informality of social 
networks that emerged outside the formal opposition party structures. The experience of the 
Collectif did not survive the post Ben Ali era, given that the parties involved are finding themselves 
increasingly at odds as to how to best ensure a smooth transition in Tunisia, and with Chebbi 
already positioning himself as an anti-Islamist candidate reneging on the experience of the alliance. 
While this might be understandable in the context of democratic politics, Tunisia is not yet there 
and some form of a united front would be a useful to reach a broad-based consensus on key reform 
legislation, including a new constitution, and to send a powerful message of unity of purpose to the 
population. It seems that even in euphoric times, old habits die hard. 
However, there is one lesson to be learned from the Tunisian experience that could 
have more general applicability in other transitional contexts in the Arab world. The weakness of 
political parties is a widespread phenomenon in the region and other forms of politics seem to be 
both more popular and legitimate, particularly among young people, who are unwilling to accept the 
formal constraints of parties often perceived as inefficient and corrupt as the ruling elite, but are 
eager for political participation. This represents a potential obstacle for democratic change because 
democratic governance still rests on representation through political parties, as they are the only 
entities with the ability to guarantee the aggregation of individual values and preferences. However, 
the poor track record of cross-party cooperation during the Ben Ali period and the coordination 
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failures that have plagued opposition parties indicate that they might not in fact be capable of 
playing the role of aggregators of preferences, with ordinary citizens growing increasingly 
frustrated at the way in which political parties seem unable to abandon their narrow interests. Thus, 
examining the failures of opposition parties in Tunisia to sustain a common front against the 
dictatorship of Ben Ali can contribute to explaining the fraught nature of the relations that exist in 
post-Ben Ali Tunisia between the political parties. The case of Tunisia highlights the challenges 
parties face in creating and sustaining effective coordination under severe authoritarian constraints 
and indicates how the legacy of coordination failures can prevent the building up of new institutions 
when the authoritarian gatekeeper is no longer present.  
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